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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAF[A) is a tri-national economic
agreement, established to encourage the flow of goods and capital between Mexico, the
United States, and Canada. The NAFIA eliminates tariffs between the member countries
and allows free investment capital for over fifteen years. This agreement was apart of a
larger picture paralleling the strategery of the European Union and it begun to become
lucid with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The intentions of the
NAFTA were focused on boosting the ailed Mexican economy while also benefiting the
upper American continent. Intense scrutiny and opposition from both public unions and
official representatives considered the agreement to be a neo-liberal conquest of the
underdeveloped Americas while others believed it matched the globalization trends of the
century.
On December 1,1976, Jose Lopez Portillo assumed presidency in Mexico and he
wound the country into a continuous downward spiral of debt. Amidst granting favoring
policies to the country's elites, Portillo discovered new oil and gas deposits on the
Eastern borders. After initial success in transitioning the focus of exports to oil and gas,
the country plummeted in 1981 as the peso's value dropped by nearly 60 percent.
Mexico's proposed earnings for 1982 from oil and gas exports (constituting 75 percent of
their foreign exchange) decreased from $27 billion to hardly $14 billion. With the nation
neck deep in a debt crisis, Portillo nationalized all the private banks and sought help from
foreign neighbors.
Concerning Mexico had a lot of debt to be collected, the IMF and U.S. officials
temporarily fixed the problem by a seven month freeze on all principals owed to banks
and an IMF loan of $3.9 billion. These terms, of course, came at conditions whereupon
Mexico had to reduce subsidies and halt wage increases. Thus, Mexico was adding new
debts to old ones and the impoverished state wasn't able to recover. The Reagan
administration, however, was devoted to the free market capabilities of Mexico and
continued the negotiation.
A new economic order was rising as Miguel De la Madrid ascended to presidency
in Mexico and favored (accompanied by the political pressures of the dominant Mexican
elite) the neo-liberal trade proposals from the U.S. Faced with the crises of continuing
the longstanding tradition of import-substitution, private subsidies of commercial
corporations, and land reform as modeled byLazarc Cardenas, De la Madrid was
surrounded by seemingly endless debt and political foreign pressure to open the floodgate
of Mexican industry to foreign investment and lower the tariffs on goods.
In 1986 the conditions mentioned before manifested into Mexico's signing of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It was designed to lower and abolish the tariffs
that restricted trade between the two countries. When, in 1988, Carlos Salinas de Gortari
assumed presidency, he privatized the Mexican industry and began selling off state
owned estates and enterprises to foreign control. Many small domestic businesses began
infiltrating the Mexican borders and the denationalization of the Mexican industry begun.
One of the more notable outcomes of GATT was the maquiladora factories in Northern
Mexico. Battling against high unemployment, the Mexican government supported the
program that enabled these American owned factories to produce parts and assemble
them in Mexico while U.S. customs allowed the finished product to be imported back
into the states without having to pay any duties. Through cheap labor and horrid working
condition laws, the maquila factories poisoned the Mexican economy. It is also true that
all of these economic, political, and social problems in Mexico allowed the globalizing
trends of the U.S. to extend their control of underdeveloped countries through the
proposal of the NAFTA.I
In 1989 George Bush Sr. began crucial economic meetings with Carlos Salinas
about a new regionally based trade agreement that would solidify the economic
relationship between the two countries. Canada was quickly introduced into the summit
meetings and negotiations altered upon the needs of all member countries. When
negotiations concluded in August 12,1992 there was a mixed reaction from the American
public. Another issue was that President Bush Sr. announced he would enact his "fast-
track" authority granted to him by the Federal Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988. This allowed the president to mandate the Congressional debate to only the
concerns of the NAFTA. They had nine months to vote yes or no on the Agreement
according to the National Review in a 1992 issue.2 After Clinton took office inthe 1992
election, he paved the way for ratification of the Agreement and in late 1993 a heated
debate left the vote in the House of Representatives at234-200 approving the NAFTA,
which took effect on January 1,1994.
The theory of the NAFTA is to primarily achieve economic success through
international trade and investment in the three signatory countries. The signatory
countries agreed to the fair treatment of all foreign exports and to not discriminate
between them thus jeopardizing the relationships of the countries. Countries, in theory,
are also supposed to give legislative right to tribunals organized by the NAFTA and
composed of all three member countries. The practice of comparative advantage is the
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basic theory for accomplishing these goals, which is achieving the most economic
success when economic actors produce only the goods and services they are best capable
of producing.
Having been ratified for barely ten years, it is clear that the NAFIA has caused
great problems concerning labor and industry control, while achieving relatively small
success. Mexico's economy was supposed to be jumpstarted from the trade agreement
when in reality only large and small private corporations are profiting off the cheap labor.
Mexican farmers along the northern border have also felt the blows of poverty when their
corn crops won't sell because of American subsidies. This paper will examine these
issues and analyze the unexpected disappointments from two of the three signatory
nations: the United States and Mexico.
One of the initial problems with a grandiose trade agreement is that it is usually a
rules-based accord which can provide intended or unintended loopholes. This can be
seen in a1995 USA Today issue written by Mark Potok who described the initial
problem with trafficking goods by trucks. Mexican trucking companies had to apply to
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and meet U.S. standards if they wanted to
bring their goods across the border. To apply to the ICC requires a $300 application fee,
driver's license, liability insurance, and up to 45 days to process. U.S. truck drivers were
already entering Mexico at this time and all Canadian drivers had access to U.S. roads.
In one instance, inspectors from Laredo turned back 530 of 744 Mexican trucks for their
safety violations.
Other problems consisted of drug trafficking concerns when opening up the
borders to Mexican truck drivers. Many opponents of the NAFTA feared that
unrestricted travel of Mexican truck drivers would cause an increase of importing
narcotics and illegal immigrants. Leon Flores Gonzales, the vice president of Mexico's
Chamber of Transport called the allegations "insulting lies to the country." He and others
like Sabino Cruz Munoz, athenMexican truck driver of forty years, feared the free trade
agreement because of the U.S. competition and fear of job loss.3
Labor, a major emphasis in this essay, has been a problem in the maquiladora
factories before the NAFTA was introduced. As one article discusses in The Nation by
David Bacon, labor unions are trounced by large corporations and their legislative power
under the GATT. Veronica Vasquez was one of many women who were fired at a
maquila contractor called Exportadora de Mano de Obra. When she was working with
the other 180 that were employed it was for no more than $20-$40 a week. In 1994
women at the factory were forced to have a bikini contest for the enjoyment of the
company president (John Shahid). Fearing their jobs they complied. Later when workers
protested for improvements in wages and conditions, Vazquez remembers that Shahid
said he would exchange it for their love. The women filed for sexual harassment and the
plant was closed down two days later.a
The Border Workers Regional Support Committee (CAFOR) recognized the
economic troubles with free trade and approached a road of education. They held
meetings for workers and citizens to teach them how to recognize health hazards. This is
an issue because in Chilpancingo, below Otay Mesa, there are many maquiladora
factories. A battery recycling plant sits on the edge of the city where lead and metal
deposits have been recorded at concentrations 40,000 times stronger than acceptable
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levels. Thus, in 1993, six babies were born into the world without brain tissue, a state
known as anencephaly. The next year thirteen more children were born with the same
sickness. Chilpancingo is one of many border towns to have recorded these anencephalic
births. One can see the intense need for health safety and the apparent loophole when
private investors are allowed into ones nation without direct legislative control.s
There has been a significant amount of job loss in the U.S. as well. A common
argument in defense of the neo-liberal Agreement would argue that the work that leaves
the states is replaced by other corporations. The reality of this is the workforce that gets
rehired by another corporation has to start over at minimum wage and probably without
the same benefits. Evidence of this is seen in the summer of 1998 when Swingline Inc.
shut down both of their Long Island plants and relocated them to Nogales, which is in the
Mexican state of Sonora. They laid off 450 people all for the benefits of cheap Mexican
labor. Such news came as a shock to employers like Chris Silvera who had just received
a three year contract and 40 cent raise at the beginning of January 1997. When Silvera
heard the announcement during his lunch break in the cafeteria he commented later
thinking "it's not that tough for the company to make the decision to move' You can
imagine: people there will work for five dollars a day. NAFTA is here to stay; there's
nothing you can do."6
The replacement of the staple factory came in March of t999 when the Board of
Education announced that it would open a school for students with disciplinary problems.
Having no educational practices the former employees had to look elsewhere. Two
companies already established in New York City were Lason Inc. and Kruysman, both
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manufacturing companies. Neither company had a union and the best of the two was
paying starting wages of $8 an hour, which was well below the Swingline average.
Swingline was one of many U.S. corporations to make the jump to Mexico with a
relatively short notice to employees.
Concerning U.S. job losses and gains as pertaining to the NAFIA industry, there
has been numerous cases in relation to the Swingline Inc. From its ratification in January
of 1994 to September of 1999, approximately 259,618 U.S. workers have lost their jobs
at the expense of cheap labor. North Carolina suffered the worst amount of losses at
27 ,725. In spite of this a FAFTA-Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program was
established to grant income replacement benefits and job training, but many of these
laborers would retum to work for wages considerably less than what their fleeting
corporation paid them. Also, not only did 20-30%o of those who applied for the service
receive it, but many primary job losers lost their work in close relation to the NAFTA.T
There is a hidden side as well to the FAFTA-TAA. It relates to the theory of
comparative advantage when people like Jose Castillo, who worked for Bluestone, (a
grape growing corporation out of southern California) lost his job and couldn't receive
benefits. Grapes were more of a comparative advantage for Mexico and Chile as 7
million boxes of grapes came north from Mexico after the first season of the Agreement.
Southern California's harvested nearly 10 million but the domination of their market
came to a halt. Soon, Bluestone gave a layoff notice for January 7 , and since it was a few
days before the seasonal workers started full-time they became ineligible to receive
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benefits from the NAFTA-TAA. Thus Jose Castillo, and another 2,543 Californians,
became victims during the first year of the Agreement to not receive financial benefits'S
It's evident that the Agreement set before the three signatory nations had good
intentions to provide mutual economic benefits. Many jobs were also created over time
in the United States and they have helped those who have lost their own. Thus far, the
Agreement has failed to accomplish probably its most anticipated goal of boosting the
Mexican economy. While the unemployment rate is declining,low wage earnings and
fleeting corporate income back into the states, disallows Mexico to achieve economic
progress. Foreign investors have no patriot ties to Mexico and with the fast-tracking of
the FTAA, many investing corporations may keep moving south, making the labor issue
of job loss a reciprocal process. The NAFTA has impacted the signatory countries
tremendously, but the gap of the privileged few and the unfortunate many will continue
to expand under this Agreement as seen by the examples given'
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